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Abstract
We document that rules for leadership succession in ethnic societies that ante-
date the modern state predict contemporary political regimes; leadership selection
by election in indigenous societies is associated with contemporary representative
democracy. The basic association, however, is conditioned on the relative strength
of the indigenous groups within a country; stronger groups seem to have been able
to shape national regime trajectories, weaker groups do not. This finding extends
and qualifies a substantive qualitative literature, which has found in local demo-
cratic institutions of medieval Europe a positive impulse towards the development
of representative democracy. It shows that contemporary regimes are shaped not
only by colonial history and European influence; indigenous history also matters.
For practitioners, our findings suggest that external reformers’ capacity for regime-
building should not be exaggerated.
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worski, and David Stasavage for useful comments on an earlier version.
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1 Introduction
Representative democracy is a modern European invention, traced commonly to the Glo-
rious Revolution of 1688 in England (e.g., Narizny 2012; Przeworski 2010, 3). Yet demo-
cratic practices such as popular assemblies, leadership succession by election, and public
deliberation are neither modern nor European. Indeed, such practices have been found in
societies that antedate the modern state in most parts of the world.1 This paper demon-
strates that one such democratic practice – leadership succession by election or communal
consensus – in indigenous societies robustly predicts contemporary representative democ-
racy at the national level.2 This finding is consistent with a substantive qualitative liter-
ature, which has found that proto-democratic institutions of medieval Europe facilitated
the development of modern, representative democracy. (Blockmans 1978; Blum 1971a;
Downing 1989, 1992; Ertman 1997). To take a few examples, Robert Dahl (2000) traced
contemporary Norwegian democracy to the premodern assemblies, the tings, and Brian
M. Downing (1988) traced the ancestry of the Swedish national parliament to informal
village assemblies. Indeed, Esposito and Voll (1996, 22) found that in most of Europe,
the existence of proto-democratic indigenous institutions provided democratic reformers
with a narrative of historical continuity, which lended legitimacy to democratic rule.
It is not obvious that a similar link would exist between modern political institutions
and indigenous institutions also outside Europe. If representative government was a Eu-
ropean invention, how can one trace it to indigenous institutions outside of Europe? In
this vein, Adam Przeworski (2010, 20), for example, writes that
”it is easy to find elements of democracy in ancient India, medieval Iceland,
or precolonial Africa, but the implication that modern polities in these places
1A few examples, listed in Muhlberger and Paine 1993, include the kampong assemblies of Malaysia, the
councils of the Amerindian confederacies, the gumlao of the Kachin in Burma, the Maori hapus, the
kokwet of the east African Sebei, the panchayats of India, and the kgotla of the Tswana in Botswana.
See, also, Sabetti 2004; and Sen 2003.
2Some of the issues investigated in this paper were independently researched by Giuliano and Nunn
(2013) who also discovered the positive cross country correlation between contemporary democracy and
the extent to which a country had democratic ethnographic societies. This is not the focus of our paper
since, as we show, the simple correlation is driven by regional differences.
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owe something to their own political traditions is farfetched. Indeed, modern
Greek democracy has no roots in the democracy of Ancient Greece. English
constitutional monarchy had more impact on modern Greek political history
than Athens did.”3
We show below that such indigenous elements of democracy are in fact associated with
contemporary democracy also outside the European continent. This suggests that there
is nothing particularly ”European” about the historical link from early subnational insti-
tutions to modern national institutions; on the contrary, the European experience seems
to generalize well outside the continent.
The modern state did not arise ex nihilo. States were built on top of and usually
in conflict with existing political units. In its simplest form, this article argues that the
way these indigenous political units were governed mattered for how the state came to
be governed. We show that the ability of indigenous units to shape subsequent regime
developments was conditioned on their relative strength; politically stronger units were
able to shape national institutions, weaker units were not. To make this argument, we rely
on Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas as well as the Standard Cross Cultural Sample
(Murdock and White 1969) to measure rules of leadership selection in 871 indigenous
societies across 106 countries. We code indigenous societies as proto-democratic if leaders
are selected by election or consensus and undemocratic otherwise. We use Polity IV to
measure contemporary democracy at the country-level. We use three different proxies
for the relative strength of indigenous political units. The first is a group’s proximity
to the country’s capital. We find that only the institutions of groups located ”close” to
the capital are associated with subsequent regime developments. This finding confirms
the notion that political influence and power in many countries are disproportionately
centered on the capital (e.g., Bates 1981, Herbst 2000). The second proxy is the complexity
of the indigenous settlement. We show that the institutions of groups with more complex
3Karl Wittfogel (1957, 108-26) also did not expect participatory government at the local level to lead to
democracy at the country level. On the contary, despotic state-level institutions are fully compatible with
pockets of subnational participatory government. This Wittfogel dubbed the ”beggar’s democracy”.
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settlement patterns are more strongly associated with national democracy. Our last proxy
for political influence is economic activity, measured at the level of the indigenous group
using satelite data on light density at night. This has been shown to correlate strongly
with economic activity (e.g., Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2011; Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou 2011). We show that the higher the current economic activity in the local
area of the indigenous group, the larger the association between the institutions of the
group and the national institutions.
With all three measures of political influence, we document a substantively relevant
and statistically significant association between indigenous rules for leadership succes-
sion and contemporary national institutions. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the average
polity2-scores by continent (and the world as a whole). There are two sets of bars for
each continent: The blue bars illustrate the full set of ethnographic societies and the red
bars are calculated for only the influential societies. Each colour is again divided into eth-
nicities with indigenous democracy below median (light colours) and above median (dark
colours). When we look at the world as a whole, there is a clear positive association be-
tween contemporary and indigneous democracy: countries with a more proto-democratic
indigenous history are more democratic today. This association does not, however, gen-
erally obtain when we compare countries within continents. Yet when we zoom in on
influential indigenous groups, defined here as groups located within 400 kilometres of
the capital, there is generally a positive association between indigenous and national
institutions (as documented in the red bars).4
[Figure 1 about here]
The regression analyses show that this association is statistically significant, obtains for
the three proxies for political power, and robust to a broad set of controls, including
4The exception to the rule is America, where the association is negative within the full sample and
insignificant within the influential sample. However, the American sample is small: There are only
between 5 and 9 countries in each group.
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historical European influence and colonization, geographical controls, as well as a set of
common correlates of democracy. We show, also, that the association between indigenous
democracy and current democracy disappears in the European settlement colonies as
expected, where the dominant position of the settlers severed the link from indigenous to
contemporary institutions.
Examining the effect of local ethnic institutions on national institutions is complicated
by endogeneity; national institutions may affect indigenous institutions, and unobserved
cultural or historical factors may plausibly affect both. To alleviate concerns of reverse
causation, note that we find a robust association between indigenous institutions and
national institutions only for ethnic groups that were relatively strong. For reverse cau-
sation to explain this finding would require that national institutions affect only local
institutions in relatively strong ethnic societies. While such a selective effect of national
institutions on local institutions is not impossible, we find it hard to rationalize. A more
straightforward interpretation of our results is that stronger groups are better able to
influence national regime trajectories. To alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias,
we used generalized sensitivity analysis (Imbens 2003; Harada 2013) and show that, for
omitted factors to explain our findings, these would have to show an exceptionally strong
association with both national and local institutions.
We propose three channels through which indigenous institutions might have affected
national regime developments. First, the existence of local assemblies provided a source of
resistance against the state. Popular assemblies could facilitate coordination and collective
action and allow local communities to raise resources (or even a local militia) to oppose
the state. This argument is much in line with the large literature that sees the origins of
representative institutions as the outcome of a bargain between a revenue-seeking ruler
and society. The stronger are societal actors vis-a`-vis the ruler, the more likely were rulers
to grant political rights in return for revenue (e.g., Bates and Lien 1985; Hoffman and
Rosenthal 1997; Tilly 1975). Second, subnational democratic institutions might affect
regime developments by teaching citizens locally the merits and mores of democracy.
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This view is naturally associated with Tocqueville (2000 [1835]) who famously likened
participatory local government to a ”primary school for democracy”. Third, we argue
that dynamics of institutional path dependence may explain the mapping of subnational
institutions into national institutions. Such dynamics, we argue, are likely to be more
prevalent when the ethnic group and the state are more congruent.
One broad implication of our findings is that modern regimes may be more deeply
grounded in indigenous societies than previous theories have suggested.5 Much of the
literature on comparative regime development outside Europe has focused on the colo-
nial legacies, effectively treating indigenous political history as secondary.6 When carried
over into the prescriptive realm, our findings suggest that external reformers’ capacity
for regime-building should not be exaggerated. While our results suggest an indigenous
grounding of national regimes, they also show that weaker groups are not generally able
to influence a country’s regime trajectory. They therefore call for caution before too much
potential for change is attached to local regime dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the argument
from historical observation and presents three potential channels through which indige-
nous institutions might affect national ones. In section 3 we describe the data and the
following section shows the basic association. In section 5 we discuss how institutions at
the level of the ethnic group can be aggregated to the country-level and propose to attach
more weight to ”influential” groups. We then document that the institutions of relatively
”strong” groups are associated with subsequent regime developments. In section 6, we
show that the association is robust to various measures of colonization, and that it disap-
pears in European settlement colonies. Sections 7 and 8 perform robustness checks and
address endogeneity concerns. The last section concludes.
5The importance of indigenous institutions for contemporary economic performance has been explored
by, e.g., Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2013); Dell (2010); Gennaioli and Rainer (2007); Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013).
6See, e.g., Chabal (1986, 3); Herbst (2000, 28f.) for similar points.
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2 From Indigenous Assemblies to Representative Gov-
ernment
The historical roots of representative government in Europe have been traced to medieval
assemblies of king and feudal lords (e.g., Myers 1975; Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Tilly
1975) as well as to local village assemblies (e.g., Dahl 2000; Downing 1988). Yet the exis-
tence of village - or tribal assemblies was clearly not unique to Europe (e.g., Muhlberger
and Paine 1993; Sabetti 2004; Sen 2003); nor were the structure and functions of such
assemblies. Rulers have convoked assemblies to give solemnity to ceremonial events and
obtain council in all parts of the world.7 Such assemblies were often unconstitutional and
ad hoc: They were called irregularly, not held in any fixed place, and without formal
legal authority (Blockmans 1978, 196; Blum 1971 554-5; Lewis 1961, 189-9; Marongiu
1968, 24). The councils often had both advisory and judicial functions. Participation was
usually restricted to adult males, and elders held a privileged position. Among their areas
of responsibility were the maintenance of order, adjudication of disputes, management of
communal resources, and public goods provision (Blum 1971, 545-7; Downing 1988, 31;
Lewis 1961, 228, 234). To meet these costs, the local communities made regular levies
upon its members; possibly by requiring able men to work for the community (Blum
1971, 547; Lewis 1961, 234).
Brian M. Downing (1988, 10) found in such local assemblies of medieval Europe ”not
only the obstacle to absolutism [...], but also a positive impulse towards popular govern-
ment.” Yet if the characteristics of these assemblies were not unique to Europe, neither,
perhaps, were their impulse towards popular government? In the remainder of this section,
we present three ways in which the existence of proto-democratic indigenous assemblies
might have influenced a country’s political regime trajectory.
First, it is an integral part of the process of state formation that states seek to eradicate
competing institutions (e.g. Hui 2004; Spruyt 1994; Tilly 1985). If societal actors are
7See, e.g., Marongiu (1968, 46) for medieval Europe. See Schapera (1967, 64) for the Sotho tribes of the
Nguni and the Tsonga.
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relatively strong, state makers may be forced to concede rights to societal representatives
(e.g., Bates and Lien 1985; Ertman 1997; Finer 1997, e.g. 1036; Hoffman and Rosenthal
1997; Levi 1988; North and Weingast 1989; North 1990; Stasavage 2003, 2010). Many
factors have been argued to shape the relative bargaining power of societal actors and
state makers, including the existence of indigenous or local government (e.g., Downing
1992; Ertman 1997) and the cohesiveness of local societies (e.g., Blum 1971b, 164-5; Boone
2003, 22; Moore 1966, 475). The existence of local government allowed communities to
coordinate actions vis-a`-vis the state, and the right to tax allowed them to mount the
resources needed to oppose state power. Thus, Thomas Ertman (1997, 22) argued that
local assemblies provided ”the resources needed to mount an effective defense [...] against
overweening royal ambition: A ready-made forum in which all of the local elite could meet
and discuss a common course of action; financial resources such as local taxes; and even
armed forces in the form of the local militia.” As well, the participatory nature of the
assemblies likely increased the cohesiveness of indigenous societies and thus their ability
and citizens’ willingness to take concerted action against the state.8 In Latin America,
the cabildos (town councils) of colonial Spanish America serve to illustrate. Here, men of
some social standing could participate in local government (e.g., Diamond et al. 1989, 3)
and elect leaders (Finer 1997, 1387). In matters of importance, the local council convoked
the public in cabildos abierto (public assemblies); it was at such public assemblies that
collective resistance and the wars of independence against the Spanish Crown were begun
in Argentina and Venezuela in 1810.9
Turning to the second channel, local assemblies with popular participation and elected
leaders may also affect national regime trajectories by forming citizen attitudes. This
perspective is naturally associated with Alexis de Tocqueville who saw participatory local
government as a training school where citizens could develop democratic mores (e.g., 2000
[1835], 46): ”Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to knowledge;
8Boone (2003, ch. 3) used the Diola society in southern Senegal to show how horizontally cohesive groups
can exhibit a considerable capacity for collective action.
9Specifically, the cabildo abierto in Buenos Aires on May 22, 1810, and in Caracas on April 19, 1810.
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they place it within reach of the people; they give the experience of the peaceful exercise
of it and habituate them to make use of it. Without municipal institutions a nation may
give itself a free government, but it does not have the spirit of liberty.”10 A contemporary
perspective on the merits of local government was given in 2005 by Wen Jiabao, then
Premier in China, stating that ”if the Chinese people can manage a village, I believe in
several years they can manage a township” (Gilley 2013, 406).
Also, proto-democratic indigenous institutions may provide democratic reformers with
a narrative of historical continuity, which lends legitimacy to democratic rule. To illus-
trate, the idea of a Scandinavian proto-democracy was first invoked in public discourse in
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the 1930s to counter the totalitarian ideological cur-
rents of Communism and Fascism (Jakobsen 2010, 322). Similarly, in early 20th century
England, the Anglo-Saxon polity was said in Encyclopedia Brittanica to provide ”all the
constituent parts of parliament” (Esposito and Voll 1996, 22).11 According to Esposito
and Voll (ibid.), such ”reconceptualizations of premodern institutions played an impor-
tant role in the development of democratic attitudes in Europe.” Tradition and historical
continuity brings legitimacy, which may induce people to struggle for democracy and
support it once it is there.
Lastly, the link from indigenous institutions to national ones may also be a result
of path dependence: Political institutions can be highly persistent; once in place, they
are hard to change. This is empirically well documented (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001; Putnam 1993), and many mechanisms have been proposed to explain this
fact.12 The argument here concerns institutional persistence from one polity (the ethnic
group) into another, which contains the first (the state). Whatever the mechanisms that
underlie it, the dynamics of path dependence are likely to be more prevalent if the two
10John Stuart Mill expressed a similar perspective on the merits of local government. He held that
”free and popular local and municipal institutions” are part of ”the peculiar training of a citizen, the
practical part of the education of a free people.” Quoted in Elkin (1987, 1).
11A similar attempt to legitimize national institutions is Lee Kwan Yew’s famous claim that democracy
was incompatible with with Asian values. This, Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi (1998, 25) found
was ”a thin veneer over his desire to hold on to power.”
12See Scott Page (2006) for a thorough and rigorous discussion of the causes of path dependence.
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polities, the state and the ethnic group, are more congruent. This was the case, for
example, in the Scandinavian countries.
In summary, local assemblies, may provide an impetus to toward national democratic
institutions as a source of resistance against repressive state power (cf., e.g., Ertman 1997,
22), as a training school for democratic practices and ideals (cf., e.g., Tocqueville), and by
the dynamics of path dependence. These channels are not, of course, mutually exclusive.
3 Data
To measure the existence of early democratic institutions at the level of the indigenous
society, we use the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) and the Standard Cross Cultural
Sample (SCCS) (Murdock and White 1969). The Atlas holds data on a broad set of
characteristics for 1265 societies across 148 countries.13 It was published in successive
installments of the journal Ethnology from 1962 onwards. The original coding was done
by Yale Professor of Anthropology George Peter Murdock based on the ethnographic
sources listed in the notes to each installment in Ethnology. About a fifth of the original
codings were checked by graduate students and collaborators (Murdock 1967, 110), and
the data set has been updated and corrected many times since its first publication in
1967 (e.g., Gray 1999; Peregrine 2003). It seems fair to say that the Ethnographic Atlas
is now becoming a standard reference in social science research (e.g., Alesina et al. 2013;
Englebert et al. 2002; Gerring et al. 2011; Giuliano and Nunn 2013; Nunn and Wantchekon
2011).
For each society, the information in the Atlas reflects ”the earliest date for which
satisfactory ethnographic data are available or can be reconstructed” [in order to] ”avoid
insofar as possible the acculturative effects of contacts with Europeans” (Murdock and
White 1969, 340). In the sample used here, 1919 is the median year to which the ethno-
graphic information pertains (the average is 1896). While these years do not generally
13The SCCS is a subsample of 186 more thorougly investigated societies from the Ethnographic Atlas.
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antedate modern statehood, the sources describing each society were ”chosen so that cul-
tural independence of each unit in terms of historical origin and cultural diffusion could
be considered maximal” (ibid., abstract). The data have thus been recorded to reflect
characteristics that predate modern statehood as well as European contact. In section
8 we discuss at some length the possibility – against the intention of the coders – that
indigenous institutions were influenced by national institutions.
The independent variable is early democratic institutions at the level of the ethno-
graphic society. This was coded using the variable Succession to the office of the local
headman (variable v276 in SCCS and v72 in the Ethnographic Atlas). Societies are coded
as democratic if leaders are selected by election or consensus and undemocratic otherwise.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the categories of local leadership succession in the data.
[Table 1 about here]
The dependent variable is contemporary democracy, measured using the 21-point scaled
variable polity2 from Polity IV. To avoid having short spells of regime instability affect
the results, polity2 is averaged over the post-Cold War period (1990-2010). Robustness
checks are done using the dichotomous democracy indicator originally constructed by
Przeworski et al. (2000) and more recently updated by Cheibub et al. (2009). With this
data, our sample consists of 871 societies in 106 countries.
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of the 871 societies in our sample.14 The
indigenous societies are represented by dots; the darker ones are coded as democratic,
lighter ones are coded as undemocratic. The coloring of countries represents the dependent
14In order to match the societies to countries, we use an ESRI shapefile of country borders. For each
indigenous society, the SCCS and the Ethnographic Atlas report the latitude and longitude of its
position. For the majority of the societies, the precision is 1 degree, amounting to an error of +/- 55
km in every direction. If we matched societies to countries exclusively by way of being located exactly
within a country’s borders, we will loose societies that were mistakenly located in the ocean barely
outside the country borders. 1107 of the 1265 societies lie exactly within country borders, 1231 lie
within 55 km of country borders. We therefore match each society to a country by identifying the
closest country of each ethnographic society. 10 of the original 1265 societies are located more than
200 km from a country border, which we interpret as a reporting error and exclude them from the
analysis. Results are robust to including them and also to choosing a different cutoff.
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variable, contemporary democracy (1990-2010) as measured by Polity IV. Again, darker
is more democratic.
[Figure 2 about here]
The figure reveals regional clustering. For example, the proportion of ethnic societies with
local democracy is comparatively large in Europe (62 percent of all societies in Europe
are coded as democratic) and in North America (31 percent) and comparatively limited
in Africa (9 percent). Thus, the map immediately suggests that between-regional varia-
tion would drive a positive association between indigenous democracy and contemporary
political regimes.
3.1 Measuring Indigenous Institutions at the Country-Level
Our dependent variable is democratic institutions at the country level, and we therefore
need a country-level measure of the indigenous institutions within a country. Local in-
stitutions can be aggregated in different ways. Giuliano and Nunn (2013), for example,
first match each ethnographic society manually to a language group. They then calculate
the country average by weighting each ethnographic society with the current population-
size of the language group, such that ethnographic societies belonging to larger language
groups are given more weight. These language groups can be quite broad, and the im-
plicit assumption is that indigenous institutions are identical within language groups
(even across societies and countries). Against this assumption, however, the renowned
anthropologists, Meyer Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940, 3), warned that ”[i]t is well to
bear in mind that within a single linguistic or cultural area we often find political systems
which are very unlike each other in many important features.”
Our approach to aggregation is different because we only record indigenous institutions
for the country in which a society was located. With this, a na¨ıve measure of indigenous
proto-democracy in country c would be the share of societies within that country where
12
leadership succession is by election, formal or informal consensus. Formally, indigc =
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc for all N societies s within country c, where indigsc is a dummy equal to 1
if society s had rules for leadership succession by either ”election or formal consensus” or
”informal consensus”, zero otherwise. Note that this approach weighs all groups within
a country equally; implicitly assuming that the groups in a country mattered equally for
subsequent regime developments. We relax this assumption in section 5.
4 Basic Correlations
Table 2 reports coefficients from OLS regressions of contemporary democracy on a coun-
try’s history of indigenous democracy corresponding to equation (1).
Dc = α + βindigc +X
′
cδ + c (1)
where Dc is contemporary democracy in country c, indigc is the share of democratic
ethnic societies in country c, and X′c is a vector of controls. The coefficient of interest
is β, which measures the association between local indigenous institutions and national
institutions.
[Table 2 about here]
Column (1) documents a highly significant, unconditional association of 3.96 between
contemporary democracy and a history of indigenous democratic institutions. Substan-
tively, this suggests that if Angola or Kazakhstan (indigc = 0) had had the same level
of indigenous democracy as, say, Italy (indigc = 1), one should expect contemporary
democracy to be 3.96 polity2-units higher, all else equal.
Column (2) controls for the (absolute) value of latitude. This is informed by Jared
Diamond’s argument that, through history, technological and institutional diffusion were
easier at similar latitudes where the length of the day and climate were not drastically
13
different (Diamond 1997, ch. 10). This specification compares countries along the histori-
cally important East-West axis rather than the disparate experiences of the North to the
South. Column (3) controls for the ”approximate time level to which the ethnographic
data pertains” (Murdock 1967, 116), since this might have a bearing on how local institu-
tions map into national ones. Column (3) thus compares countries for which the timing of
the ethnographic information is roughly similar. Column (4) adds a control for historical
development, proxied by settlement complexity. In line with Alesina et al. (2013) and
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), we proxy development by the variable ”Settlement Pat-
terns” (variable v30 in the Ethnographic Atlas and v234 in the SCCS), which measures
the permanency and density of settlements ranging from ”Nomadic or fully migratory”
to ”Complex settlements” on an 8-point scale. Comparing countries at similar levels of
latitude, timing of the ethnographic data collection, and societal complexity does not
affect the coefficient of interest.
Reassuringly, the results in columns (1)-(4) are entirely consistent with those presented
in Giuliano and Nunn (2013), despite the differences in aggregation techniques, control
variables and the time-frame in which contemporary democracy is measured. The mag-
nitude of the estimated association is even quite similar. Guillano and Nunn’s estimates
range from 2.0 to 3.6 and ours lie between 2.7 and 3.96; the intervals are statistically
indistinguishable.
In column (5), we include a full set of regional dummies.15 Figure 2 suggested that
the proportion of ethnic groups with popularly elected headmen is not evenly distributed
geographically: The highest proportion of ethnic groups with leadership succession by
election or consensus was found in Europe; the lowest was found in Africa. When regional
fixed effects are included, the coefficient measures the average intra-regional association
between indigenous and national institutions, effectively comparing European countries
to other European countries, and so on. This nearly cuts the estimated association in
half and it is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. This does not in-
15The regions included are sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania, North America, South America,
and the Middle East and North Africa.
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validate the finding, however; indeed, it is the central claim in a historical-sociological
literature (e.g., Downing 1989, 1992; Ertman 1997) that contemporary Europe is compar-
atively democratic precisely because of its early modern history of local, proto-democratic
assemblies.
5 Whose Indigenous Institutions Matter?
We now relax the assumption that all groups within a country matter equally for its
political regime dynamics. Some groups are inevitably more powerful than others and
better able to influence the national regime trajectory. In North America, for example,
European settlers were more powerful than the indigenous groups and better able, there-
fore, to impose their preferred institutions on the country as a whole. In the late 19th
century, villagers in contemporary Ukraine elected their own district leader, but attempts
at regime change from below were crushed by the tsar (Gilley 2013, 397). Similarly in
China, where initatives for township elections were brought to a halt by the government
(ibid., 397). These examples illustrate how subnational institutions that are not backed
by sufficiently powerful groups likely do not map into national institutions.
Even if the idea is theoretically straightforward, measuring the relative power or in-
fluence of indigenous groups is not. We propose three different proxies for groups’ relative
political power. The first is proximity to the current capital. This is based on the idea
that if power is concentrated in the capital, proximity to the capital likely facilitates
political influence. The two second proxies are measures of past and current economic
development; the basic motivation being that more developed societies were likely to be
more influential. Strictly speaking, of course, all proxies measure the base of power (e.g.,
Dahl 1957, 202; Simon 1953, 507f.), i.e. the resources and conditions for the exercise of
power or influence; not the power relation itself. All three proxies yield identical results.
Proximity to the capital Usually, a country’s capital is home to its highest political
offices and decision-making authority. It is home also to the means of coercion and law
15
enforcement (or the administration of it, at a minimum) and the central bureaucracy.
Physical proximity to this centre of authority likely increases political influence (e.g.,
Campante, Do, and Guimaraes 2013; Ades and Glaeser 1995, 198f; Herbst 2000; Olsson
and Hansson 2011).16 First, the threat of violence or rebellion is less urgent from a dis-
tance, and groups’ ability to exchange force for political influence should thus increase
with their proximity from the capital. Second, since influential public offices are concen-
trated in the capital, public officials are likely to be recruited from the groups located in
the vicinity of the capital. Third, groups closer to the capital are better able to monitor
what happens there. The state, therefore, is likely to be more responsive to the demands
of groups living closer to the capital. Finally, the location of the capital is itself endoge-
nous to an underlying distribution of power among different groups in a country. The
dominant group, we argue, is likely to set up the institutional infrastructure in its own
vicinity.
In many European colonies, capital cities were externally imposed: Colonizers often
centralized authority in capitals that were either built from scratch or relocated to a
new city that met better the logistical needs of the colonial power.17 Yet, also in colonies
are capitals the locus of power. Thus, the relocation served to weaken the ties between
the capital-region and the rest of the country, and Europeans often only made limited
efforts to extend the power and political reach of the capital into the countryside. Politics
in former colonies is therefore widely regarded as being disproportionately centered on
the capital (e.g., Bates 1981; Herbst 2000). This capital-bias often continued into the
post-colonial period, because the urban population and the capital region in particular
were critical to leaders’ political survival (e.g., Alence 2004; Bates 1981; Bratton and de
Walle 1992). Regardless of whether countries were colonized or not, we hypothesize that
societies located closer to the capital are better able to affect a country’s regime trajectory
16Herbst (2000) and Olsson and Hansson (2011) focus on the projection of power from the capital, arguing
that the state’s ability to broadcast power decreases with the distance from the capital. Campante,
Do, and Guimaraes (2013) and Ades and Glaeser (1995) focus on how distance matters for the ability
to project influence into the capital. Our perspective is the latter.
17Lusaka, Nairobi, and Harare were all, for example, built de novo, whereas, e.g., Lagos and Accra were
upgraded to capitals by the British.
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than groups located further away. The association between national political institutions
and indigenous institutions should thus increase when we zoom in on indigenous societies
located closer to the capital.
To introduce the empirical model, assume to start with that we do have information
on current democracy at the level of indigenous societies, Dsc. Let the indicator variable
Isc, described in detail below, equal one if the society is located ”close” to the capital,
zero otherwise. To see if the association between indigenous and national institutions is
conditioned on societies’ relative proximity to the capital, one can estimate the following
equation:
Dsc = α + β1indigsc + β2indigsc × Isc + γIsc +X′scδ + sc (2)
If indigenous democracy is positively associated with current democracy in politically
influential societies, we expect that β2 > 0. Yet by construction, contemporary national
democracy does not vary at the level of the indigenous groups, but only at the country
level. Therefore, we aggregate all variables to the country-level and obtain the following:18
Dc = α + β1indigc + β2indig
p
c + γclosec +X
′
cδ + c (3)
where Dc is contemporary democracy in country c, indig
p
c=
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc×Isc is the av-
erage level of democracy among indigenous societies interacted with whether the society
is located close to the capital city. closec measures the fraction of societies located close
to the capital city of country c. In order to estimate the significance of the association
between current democracy and indigenous democracy among politically powerful soci-
eties, one needs to estimate the significance of the composite estimate β1 + β2. Instead,
we estimate the equivalent model to get a direct estimate of the association of interest:
Dc = α + β3indig
p
c + β4indig
np
c + γclosec +X
′
cδ + c (4)
18We arrive at equation (3) by: 1N
∑N
s=1Dsc= α + β1
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc + β2
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc ×
Isc+γ
1
N
∑N
s=1 Isc+
1
N
∑N
s=1X
′
scδ +
1
N
∑N
s=1 sc.
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where indignpc =
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc × (1 − Isc) is the average level of democracy among
indigenous societies interacted with whether the society is located far from the capital
city. Now, the estimate of interest, β3 measures the direct impact of indigenous democracy
in politically influential societies. We allow ”close” to vary at increments of 100 kilometers
ranging from a distance of 1,000 kilometers (or more) to 100 (or less). In the few cases
where a capital was relocated, we focus on the contemporary capital.19 The capital of
interest here must have served as capital at the moment in which the foundations of a
political regime are laid. And since we focus on the contemporary regime, we focus also
on the contemporary capital.
All models include the following controls in addition to the controls from Table 2: A
control for (log of) the country area, since democratic rule may be more viable in smaller
countries (e.g., Dahl and Tufte 1973; Stasavage 2010) and since indigenous groups are
closer to the capital in smaller countries.20 Further, since many capitals are located close
to the ocean, which may itself improve the prospects for democracy by, e.g., facilitating
economic integration with the outside world, we control for the (log of) average distance
to the coast from all ethnographic societies within a country. Lastly, since the measure is
based on the societies located ”close” and ”far” from the capital as defined in each column,
we control for the share of ethnographic societies located ”close” to the capital.21 Table
3 shows the results.22
[Table 3 about here]
19In our sample of 106 countries, eight capitals have moved since 1960. These are Cote d’Ivoire (Abidjan
to Yamoussoukro in 1983; Kasakhstan (Almaata to Astana in 1997); Malawi (from Zomba to Lilongwe
in 1974); Micronesia (Kolonia to Palikir in 1989); Myanmar (Rangoon to Naypyidaw in 2005); Nigeria
(from Lagos to Abuja in 1991); Pakistan (Karachi to Islamabad in 1974); Tanzania (Dar es Salaam to
Dodoma in 1996).
20Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013) show that capital isolation is associated with misgovernance.
They operationalize capital isolation as the natural log of the average distance of a country’s population
to its capital. Controlling for the natural log of the average distance of a country’s ethnographic societies
to its capital instead of country size does not affect the results in Table 3.
21Results are robust to excluding either of these controls.
22Instead of this interaction model, a na¨ıve way to test the hypothesis would be to let the measure of
indigenous proto-democracy be based only on the societies located close to the capital city, throwing
away the information on all other societies. The results in Table 3 hold in this model.
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The table documents that the indigenous institutions of societies located in the prox-
imity of a country’s capital are more strongly associated with its national institutions
than are the institutions of societies located further away. Panels A and B are identical
except that, in Panel B, regional fixed effects are included. Column (2) shows that the
indigenous institutions of ethnic groups located within 1,000 kilometers of the capital are
significantly and positively correlated with national institutions (a point estimate of 3.65);
institutions in societies located further away are uncorrelated with national institutions.
Moreover, when the average proximity to the capital is increased gradually (shown in
column (2)-(11)), the association between indigenous and national institutions increases
almost monotonically. When regional fixed effects are included in panel B, the parame-
ter estimate becomes significant for indigenous institutions located within 800 kilometers
of the capital. The squared brackets below the estimates indicate the number of ethnic
societies located ”close” and ”far” from the capital city.
The results in Table 3 are thus consistent with the discussion above; if political power
and the ability to shape subsequent national regime trajectory are centered on the cap-
ital, we should expect the estimated coefficient to increase for ethnic societies located
in relative proximity to the capital.23 In the rest of the paper, we use the specification
in column (8) where ”close” is defined as being within 400 kilometres of the capital. As
measured by R2, this specification provides the best fit with the data.
Settlement complexity Our second proxy for the indigenous groups’ ability to influence
country-level institutions is the complexity of their settlements.24 Settlement patterns are
usually taken by archeologists as an indication of political and social development (e.g.,
Steponaitis 1981).25 More developed societies are better able to raise the resources needed
23This result is tangent to the study by Stasavage (2010), who finds that the ability to sustain national
assemblies declines with the average distance from the capital. It is tangent, also, to the study by
Wantchekon and Ponce´ (2011), who find that, in Africa, urban insurgencies are followed by democratic
regime transitions whereas rural insurgencies are followed by autocracy.
24The variable is an eight-point scale ranging from ”Nomadic or fully migratory” to ”Complex settle-
ments”.
25Population density is another oft used proxy for economic development. While data population on den-
sity is not available at the level of the ethnic group, it should be mentioned that settlement complexity
is strongly and significantly correlated with the total population size of a society (0.58, p-value 0.00
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to build armies and coordinate war-making efforts (cf. Crone 1986, 171). More generally,
economic capability is a fungible source of power that can be used in disparate areas (e.g.,
Waltz 1979, 131).
To examine if settlement complexity conditions the association between indigenous
institutions and national institutions, we estimated equation (7):
Dc = α + β1indig
c
c + β2indig
nc
c + γcomplexc +X
′
cδ + c (5)
Equation (7) is similar to equation (6) except that indigcc=
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigscIsc, where Isc
now equals one if the particular society is complex, zero otherwise. Similarly for indigncc .
We allow the definition of complex to vary in increments from more complex than ”no-
madic or fully migratory” to more complex than ”compact permanent” settlements.
complexc measures the share of societies that are defined as complex according to the
particular cutoff. Table 4 reports the results.
[Table 4 about here]
In the first column, all societies that are more complex than ”nomadic or fully migratory”
are defined as politically strong. Moving towards the right in the table, the definition of
”politically strong” is gradually tightened, until column (7) where only societies that are
coded as having complex setttlements in the Atlas are defined as politically strong. The
table shows that the indigenous institutions in relatively complex societies are associ-
ated with contemporary national institutions, whereas those in less complex societies are
not. This suggests that more developed indigenous groups were better able to influence
national regime trajectories.26 In the analyses that follow, we used the specification in
column (6), since this provides the best description of the data as measured by R2.
for the 582 available societies).
26In column (7) the estimated association remains positive, but insignificantly so. This is likely due to
the small number of complex settlements in our data (only about 3 percent of the societies in our
sample are coded as complex settlements.
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Economic activity at the grid level Our third proxy for the relative power of indige-
nous groups is their level of contemporary economic development. Since official statistics
(e.g., GPD per capita) are not constructed for ethnic groups, we proxy economic activity
using satellite data on light density at night. The usefulness of this measure has recently
been established by Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2011), who demonstrate a strong
within-country correlation between light density at night and GDP levels. The measure
was further corroborated by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011, 11), who show that
within countries in sub-Saharan Africa, light density correlates strongly with household
income. At the level of the ethnic society (where income data is unavailable), they further
document that light density correlates with educational attainment.
The data on light density at night in year 2000 is provided by the National Geophysical
Data Center at NASA.27 For each grid cell of 0.5 × 0.5 degrees, the data measures the
degree of luminousity at night. For each indigenous society, we calculated the average
light density within a circle of 200 km radius.
Light density reflects the contemporary level of development in the area of an ethnic
group. The motivation behind this proxy is that societies that managed to (later) generate
higher economic activity were also more likely to influence national regime trajectories.28
One caveat is in order: Light density likely reflects urbanization as much as economic
activity. Luminosity is likely therefore to be centered on a country’s capital meaning that
two of our proxies for political power (proximity to capital and night-time luminosity)
might in fact capture the same underlying reality. As it turns out, however, the two
proxies are essentially orthogonal (the correlation is -0.02; the p-value is 0.50).29
27Available online at http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/.
28Using contemporary light density implicitly assumes that the contemporary homeland of an ethnic
group is the same as identified in Murdock’s (1967) atlas. This does seem justifiable, however. Focus-
ing on the individual level, Nunn and Wantchekon (2008, 36) find a strong correlation of 0.62 between
the location of individuals in 2005 and the historical homeland of their ethnic group. Presumably,
entire societies are less susceptible to relocation than are individuals. This arguably makes the as-
sumption of constant location less demanding here than in, e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon (2008, 2011)
or Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013). Further, the fact that some societies obviously did change
location over the period of analysis will bias our estimate of interest towards zero. In this respect, our
results can be seen as a lower bound of the impact of indigenous democracy.
29Moreover, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011, 10-11) show that the association between luminosity
and economic development is strengthened once the effect of urbanization has been partialled out.
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To examine whether the ability of ethnographic societies to influence national politi-
cal institutions is conditioned on their relative economic development, we estimated the
following OLS regression:
Dc = α + β1indigc + β2indig
light
c + γlightc +X
′
cδ + c (6)
where indigc is the fraction of proto-democratic indigenous societies in country c, indig
light
c =
1
N
∑N
s=1 indigsc × lightsc for the N societies s within country c. lightsc is the (0.01 + log
of) average light density within a circle of 200 km of the centre of society s in country c.30
lightc is the average night-time luminosity across the societies in country c. X
′
c represents
controls. The coefficients of interest are a composite of β1 and β2.
[Table 5 about here]
Column (1) in Table 5 shows the results from a simple model that includes only indige-
nous democracy, light density, and the interaction between the two. As hypothesized, the
coefficient on the interaction term is positive and highly significant. This means that the
local institutions of more economically developed groups are associated more strongly
with national institutions. At the sample mean of light density (-1.43), the marginal as-
sociation between local and national institutions is 3.54 + 1.16 × (−1.43) = 1.88. For
societies with higher luminosity, the marginal association is higher. Columns (2) and (3)
add our standard controls (latitude; the average year to which the ethnographic infor-
mation pertains; societal complexity) and a full set of regional fixed effects. This did not
change the conclusion.
In sum, across all three proxies, the association between indigenous institutions and
contemporary regimes is increasing in the (proxy for the) relative power of the indigenous
groups. We proceed to examine the robustness of this finding.
30The natural log of 0.01 + light density was used to account for a few extreme observations in the right
tail of the distribution and to ensure that observations were not lost when log transforming. This is
similar to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 125). The results are robust to excluding the societies
with zero light density.
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6 Outside Europe: Colonization and Indigenous Democ-
racy
Colonialism caused profound disjunctures in authority structures and social hierarchy
in most of the world outside Europe. Even if the colonial state rarely lasted more than
a few centuries, it is not obvious, therefore, that one can find deep continuities from
precolonial indigenous institutions to contemporary, postcolonial institutions. Moreover,
if representative institutions are a European invention, how can one trace it to indigenous
institutions outside of Europe? In Table 6, we demonstrate that, outside Europe and after
controlling for the influence of European colonization, indigenous institutions are still
associated with contemporary institutions. Columns (1)-(3) control for a set of plausible
determinants of European colonization; columns (4)-(10) control for indicators of different
colonial experiences. Political influence is proxied by luminosity in Panel A; proximity
to the capital in Panel B; and settlement complexity in Panel C. The three proxies yield
qualitatively identical results.
[Table 6 about here]
The first column adds a control for precolonial state development. Hariri (2012) shows
that precolonial state development was an historical impediment to the development of
democracy, because of the way it shaped European colonization. If local democracy was an
obstacle to political centralization (cf., e.g., Ertman 1997, 22) and political centralization
was an historical obstacle to the transmission of institutions and ideals from Europe, this
could be driving our findings. Column (1) shows, however, that the result is robust to
comparing countries at similar levels of precolonial state development.
Much work has established that geographical factors can shape (indigenous) institu-
tional choices (e.g., Alsan 2013; Bentzen et al. 2012) as well as colonial experiences (e.g.,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Nunn and Puga 2012). Controlling for a set
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of geographical variables in column (2), however, leaves the coefficients on local democ-
racy and local democracy interacted with light density positive and highly statiscally
significant. Controlling for precolonial population density in column (3) (cf. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2002) does not affect the parameter of interest.
Columns (4)-(6) include, in turn, a dummy for countries that were colonized, colonial
duration, and a set of colonizer fixed effects. None of these controls change the coefficients
of interest. In column (7) we control for the extent of ’indirect rule’ in colonial governance.
Under indirect rule, colonial powers ruled through existing institutions, which often rein-
forced the traditional authority structures (e.g., Boone 2003) or destroyed participatory,
traditional institutions (e.g., Ashton 1947; Mamdani 1996).31 As expected, the extent
of indirect colonial rule is negatively associated with contemporary democracy. But the
coefficients on indigenous democracy remain positive and highly significant in Panels A-C.
Column (8) in Table 6 zooms in on European settler colonies, defined as former colonies
where at least 10 percent of the population is of European descent. This definition yields
22 settler colonies. For this group of countries, there was no association between indige-
nous institutions and national institutions. This is unsurprising. To take but one example,
the founding fathers at the Constitutional Convention in Philidelphia were influenced by
Enlightenment ideals, not indigenous American institutions. Column (9) shows that all
results obtain when settlement colonies are excluded. Column (10), finally, includes an
interaction between European settlement and indigenous democracy. The negative co-
efficient shows that European settlement significantly weakens the association between
indigenous institutions and contemporary institutions.
31Matthew Lange (2004) proposed to measure indirect rule by the number of colonially recognized
customary court cases divided by the total number of court cases. The idea is that colonial powers
would not recognize customary courts under direct rule, but rather implement a uniform legal system
based on metropolitan laws. Under indirect rule, however, the colonial legal system would incorporate
the indigenous legal structure. In our sample this measure unfortunately only exists for 20 former
colonies, but because the form of colonial rule varied very systematically with the number of settlers
(Lange 2004, 908; Gerring et al. 2011, 388), we used our measures of settlement to predict the extent
of indirect rule for the countries with missing values. While this is a crude measure of indirect rule, we
should emphasize that we reach the same conclusion for the 20-country sample with Lange’s original
measure as with the imputed measure of indirect rule.
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7 Robustness
The model in column (1), Table 7, excludes countries in Europe as well as the Euro-
pean offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA). If the link from early
institutions to national democracy is particular to Europe (as argued by, e.g., Downing
(1992, 18ff) and consistent with Figure 2), these countries could be driving the finding.
This does not seem to be the case, though. For all three measures of political power,
the conclusion remains; indigenous democracy in politically strong societies is positively
associated with current democracy levels, also outside Europe and neo-Europe.
[Table 7 about here]
The historical span of the data in the Ethnographic Atlas is wide: The first percentile is
year 1570 BC; the 99th is 1960. In columns (2) and (3) we exclude in turn the earliest
decile (1860) and latest decile (1950) to see if the basic conclusion obtains also for a more
temporally focused sample. We exclude societies recorded early since early information is
presumably less precise and because the assumption that ethnographic societies have not
relocated since they were coded in the Atlas seems more demanding for these societies.
Excluding the late decile is more a check for reverse causality, which should be more
of an issue among the societies where the ethnographic information was recorded later.
Columns (2) and (3) show that our results are robust to excluding these societies.
Finally, in columns (4) and (5), we exclude influential observations. DFBETA mea-
sures the difference in the estimated coefficient for local democracy when a country is
included and when it is excluded from the sample. Following Besley, Kuh, and Welsch
(1980, 28), the model in column (4) omits the countries for which |DFBETAi| >2/√n,
where n is the number of observations. The model in column (5) excludes all high-leverage
countries. In both cases, the coefficient on local democracy remains positive and significant
as does the light density-interaction. As shown in Panel B, for all controls and sample
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manipulations, the basic conclusion obtains also when political influence is proxied by
relative proximity to the capital.
Table 8 compares countries at similar levels of a number of common correlates of
democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 80) found that ”economic development carries
with it the political correlate of democracy.” It is possible that indigenous democracy is
associated with modern representative democracy because it fostered economic develop-
ment (which would inscribe our story into modernization theory). Yet column (1) shows
that the basic association is robust to controlling contemporary economic development.
[Table 8 about here]
Protestant Christianity has been argued to be particularly conducive to democracy (e.g.,
Bruce 2006), and Islam is commonly argued to be particularly inimical to democracy
(e.g., Huntington 1993, 40). If Protestant individualism was conducive to participatory
political institutions at both a local and a national level (and Islam the opposite), the
association we have uncovered would be spurious, driven by culture. Column (2), however,
rejects this view: If anything the association is strengthened when the influence of religion
is partialled out.
Column (3) controls for societal heterogeneity, which is commonly seen as inimical to
democracy. If countries with a higher proportion of democratic indigenous societies are
more homogenous, this would bias upwards the estimated coefficients. Column (3) shows
that this is not the case, however. Lastly, column (4) controls for natural resources. At all
levels of political order, the availability of natural resource rents raises the cost of sharing
power. Yet as shown in column (4), this does not drive our basic conclusion.
Panels A, B, and C in Table 8 thus show that whether we proxy political influence
by economic current wealth, proximity to the capital, or historical societal density, the
basic association between indigenous democracy and national representative institutions
is robust to controlling for indicators of a set of alternative theories of the causes and
correlates of democracy.
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8 Endogeneity Concerns
The rules for leadership selection were not assigned randomly across indigenous groups,
and the coefficients presented are thus more properly seen as conditional correlations than
causal estimates. There are two challenges to causal identification here: National insti-
tutions may shape indigenous institutions (reverse causation), and unobservable omitted
factors may confound the association between the two. Beginning with the first, many
scholars have documented instances where dynamics at the state-level shape indigenous
institutions. One important example is Mahmood Mamdani’s important Citizen and Sub-
ject (1996), which shows how the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa transformed
traditional authority. The public assembly, for example, ”was turned into a forum where
decisions were announced but not debated” (Mamdani 1996, 46). While many such ex-
amples can be found,32 reverse causation does not in our view adequately account for the
findings presented above. For reverse causation to account for our findings would require
that national institutions only shape the indigenous institutions in stronger groups and
have no effect on the institutions in weaker indigenous units. As well, our three proxies
for the strenght of indigenous units are essentially orthogonal.33 This means that – while
one can easily imagine that national institutions shaped the institutions of groups located
closer to the capital compared to those further away – reverse causation requires that
national institutions should affect indigenous institutions in the vicinity of the capital and
in economically developed areas and in groups with higher historical settlement density
– but not elsewhere. Rationalizing such a ”selective effect” of national institutions on
indigenous institutions is not straightfoward. Moreover, it should be remembered that
the data on indigenous societies were collected to reflect each unit’s indigenous traits and
32For example, Jerome Blum (1971a, 586ff) documented how the central governments in medieval Eng-
land, Saxony, and Northwest Germany weakened the village community through well-meaning policies
of Bauernschutz (peasant protection). In a recent and interesting literature, local pockets of authori-
tarianism in otherwise democratic countries are also explained from central dynamics (e.g., Gervasoni
2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2012).
33Across the 869 societies where data is available for the three proxies for political strength, proximity
to the capital correlates 0.03 with (log 0.01+) light intensity and -0.36 with settlement complexity.
Settlement complexity and light intensity correlates at -0.03.
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thus be independent of state-level influence (or the influence from, e.g., colonists).
Turning to the problem of omitted variables, the analyses above showed the associ-
ation between indigenous - and contemporary democracy to be robust to a broad set
of observable potential confounders. The obvious limitation is that we cannot observe
unobservables and cannot assess their confounding effects. To understand if unobserved
confounding could be driving our findings, we used the Generalized Sensitivity Analysis
developed by Imbens (2003) and Harada (2013), depicted in Figure 3. This method sim-
ulates unobserved variables and asks how influential such variables would have to be in
order to substantively change the estimated association between indigenous democracy
and contemporary democracy.
Figure 3 about here
The downward sloping curve in Figure 3 shows the required partial association between an
unobserved factor and contemporary democracy (vertical axis) and indigenous democracy
(horizontal axis) that would cut the coefficient of interest in half. The figure shows that
an unobserved factor should explain more than twice as much of the variation in both
indigenous and contemporary democracy than do our most influential observed covariates.
Thus, it would have to be more influential than ’close’ (an indicator for societies located
within 400 kilometers of the capital), which is correlated with indigenous democracy by
construction. It would also have to be much more influential than any of the existing
theories of democracy pertaining to, e.g., GDP per capita, European language fraction
or societies’ (average) distance to the ocean. This strikes us as unlikely.
The Generalized Sensitivity Analysis does not rule out that omitted variables could
explain our findings. It does show, however, that we would have to assume a very strong
unobserved confounding effect for an unobservable factor to substantively change our
findings. We performed a similar analysis to see if omitted variables could turn the esti-
mated association insignificant at a ten percent level. The conclusion here was the same:
The omitted variable in question would have to be much more strongly correlated with in-
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digenous and contemporary democracy than any of the theoretically motivated variables
considered thus far.
9 Conclusion
This article has documented a substantial and robust association between indigenous
political institutions and contemporary national regimes: Territories where indigenous
groups selected their leaders through elections or consensus are more likely to be demo-
cratic countries today. However, this basic association was conditioned on the relative
strength of the indigenous groups within a country; stronger groups seem to have been
able to shape national regime trajectories, weaker groups do not.
At the broadest level, our findings document the weight of history in explaining con-
temporary political outcomes and suggest that we ought to be careful to avoid accounting
for these only by processes developing since the beginning of modernization. Moreover,
in addition to colonial history and historical European influence, our results show that
indigenous history seems to have shaped the contemporary spread of democracy. Some
observers have seen in Chinese village democracy a model for national democracy in
China (e.g., Financial Times, January 30, 2013). Yet our results suggest caution here:
Subnational institutions do not seem to translate into national institutions unless the
subnational group in question is powerful enough to impose its institutions on the coun-
try as a whole.
While we have emphasized the role of history, we do not want to suggest historical de-
terminism in political regime developments. Our argument is clearly not that democracy
cannot become consolidated in countries that did not have proto-democratic indigenous
institutions. While the evidence suggests that indigenous institutions are an indepen-
dently important factor in explaining contemporary regimes – it is not the only factor,
nor is it the principal one.
This article has presented three ways in which proto-democratic indigenous insti-
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tutions might shape subsequent regime developments. Future research should focus on
tracing empirically the mediating mechanisms that link countries’ national institutions
to their indigenous ones.
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Table 1. Succession to the Office of the Local Headman
Obs
Patrilineal heir 408
Matrilineal heir 101
Appointment by higher authority 42
Senority or age 28
Influence, wealth or social status 42
Election or other formal consensus 100
Informal consensus 87
Absence of any such office 102
Total 910
Source. The variable is constructed from variables v276
from the SCCS and v72 from the Ethnographic Atlas.
Table 2. OLS-Regressions of Contemporary Democracy on Indigenous Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is mean polity2 1990-2010
Indigenous democracy 3.96*** 2.91** 2.90** 2.71* 1.56
(1.43) (1.36) (1.35) (1.42) (1.41)
Absolute latitude 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
Year 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Societal complexity 0.15 0.20
(0.35) (0.32)
Region FE No No No No Yes
Observations 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.43
Notes. All models include a constant term.
The regions included in column (5) are sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe,
North America, and the Middle East and North Africa.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3. Contemporary and Indigenous Democracy Interacted with Distance from the Capital
Distance, d, from the capital (in kilometers)
1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010
Indigenous democracy 2.70*
(1.44)
Indigenous democracy within 3.65** 3.63** 4.17*** 4.83*** 5.01*** 5.83*** 6.43*** 5.44*** 5.14*** 5.10***
d distance from capital (1.53) (1.55) (1.41) (1.51) (1.52) (1.45) (1.41) (1.51) (1.62) (1.83)
[515] [485] [454] [411] [370] [307] [251] [186] [120] [48]
Indigenous democracy outside 0.03 0.39 -3.23 -3.22 -3.29 -3.34 -2.94 0.28 1.26 2.48
d distance from capital (8.80) (8.27) (7.21) (4.67) (4.44) (2.92) (2.43) (2.79) (2.73) (1.87)
[356] [386] [417] [460] [501] [564] [620] [685] [751] [825]
Region FE No No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.23
Panel B Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010
Indigenous democracy 2.02
(1.47)
Local democracy within 2.20 2.25 3.02** 3.59** 3.46** 3.68*** 4.30*** 3.68** 3.38** 3.57*
d distance from capital (1.48) (1.49) (1.32) (1.51) (1.49) (1.38) (1.33) (1.44) (1.58) (1.94)
Local democracy outside -1.77 -2.30 -6.73 -4.32 -3.57 -2.49 -2.78 -0.50 0.19 1.14
d distance from capital (7.80) (7.48) (5.69) (3.77) (3.66) (3.15) (2.44) (2.63) (2.46) (1.90)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.47
Notes. All models include a constant term, controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic
information in a country pertains), average societal complexity in a country, country size (log), average distance to the coast from
each ethnographic society (log), and the share of societies located ”close” to the capital city according to the particular cutoff
level (the latter variable is not included in col 1). The number of ethnographic societies with non-missing headman and non-missing
polity2-score within distance d of the capital are in square brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 4. Contemporary and Indigenous Democracy Varying the degree of Settlement Complexity
Level of settlement complexity, c
Semi- Semi- Compact, Dispersed Single Compact Complex
nomadic sedentary impermanent homesteads community permanent settlement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010
Indigenous democracy with 2.70* 3.88*** 3.89*** 3.83*** 3.17** 4.21*** 3.28
complexity level >= c (1.52) (1.47) (1.42) (1.41) (1.49) (1.59) (4.28)
Indigenous democracy with -1.02 -2.22 -0.90 -0.48 1.11 -1.71 2.31
complexity level < c (4.10) (3.77) (3.80) (3.88) (3.94) (3.53) (1.46)
Region FE No No No No No No No
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18
Panel B Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010
Indigenous democracy with 1.42 2.81 3.01* 3.08* 2.51 3.60** 0.98
complexity level >= c (1.50) (1.70) (1.58) (1.56) (1.69) (1.72) (3.76)
Indigenous democracy with -1.76 -3.06 -2.43 -2.06 -2.47 -4.13* 1.69
complexity level < c (2.62) (3.36) (3.16) (2.91) (2.26) (2.35) (1.46)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.43
Notes. All models include a constant term, controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average
year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), average societal complexity in a country,
and the share of societies above complexity level c as a share of all societies within a country
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 5. Contemporary and Indigenous Democracy: Luminosity Interactions
Mean polity2 1990-2010
(1) (2) (3)
Indigenous democracy 3.24** 3.28** 2.36*
(1.37) (1.35) (1.34)
Indigenous democracy 1.37*** 1.36** 1.14**
× light density (0.47) (0.53) (0.49)
Light density 0.28 0.02 0.46
(0.37) (0.39) (0.44)
Regional FE No No Yes
Baseline controls No Yes Yes
Observations 106 106 106
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.47
Notes. All models include a constant term. ’Baseline
controls’ refers to latitude, timing (the average year to
which the ethnographic information in a country
pertains), and average societal complexity in a country.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 6. Indigenous Roots and colonialism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A Political influence proxied by economic activity
Indigenous democracy 3.98** 4.13** 4.41*** 4.71*** 4.52** 4.84*** 5.06*** -0.52 6.11*** 5.39***
(1.61) (1.70) (1.64) (1.72) (1.73) (1.77) (1.66) (1.53) (2.01) (1.97)
Indigenous democracy x light density 1.50** 1.71** 1.79*** 2.02*** 1.81*** 1.91*** 2.08*** 0.18 2.57*** 2.04***
(0.61) (0.71) (0.65) (0.63) (0.62) (0.63) (0.62) (0.53) (0.76) (0.62)
Precolonial state development -2.29
(2.09)
p-value for geographical controls [0.16]
Population density 1500 0.07
(0.07)
Colony -0.47
(1.90)
p-value for colonizer FE [0.91]
Colonial duration 0.01***
(0.00)
Indirect rule -3.41
(2.17)
Indigenous democracy x settle -4.44*
(2.39)
Settlement colonies 3.49
(3.74)
R-squared 0.45 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.93 0.34 0.44
Panel B Political influence proxied by proximity to the capital
Indigenous democracy within 4.64*** 4.54** 5.17*** 4.63*** 5.42*** 5.04** 5.04*** 2.48 6.16*** 5.36**
400 km. of capital (1.68) (1.83) (1.75) (1.72) (1.85) (1.95) (1.78) (1.67) (2.05) (2.08)
Indigenous democracy outside -2.66 -3.15 -3.73 -3.12 -2.76 -2.32 -2.77 -6.32 -4.32 -2.25
400 km. of capital (3.15) (2.77) (2.82) (2.92) (3.01) (3.15) (2.97) (3.62) (3.29) (3.16)
Panel C Political influence proxied by societal complexity
Indigenous democracy in 4.06** 4.65*** 4.19** 4.92** 5.19** 6.14*** 5.08** 0.24 6.60*** 5.09**
compact or complex soc (1.98) (1.75) (1.88) (2.06) (2.01) (2.06) (2.01) (1.39) (2.48) (2.33)
Indigenous democracy in -3.68 -4.59* -3.73 -3.99* -3.28 -4.73** -4.15* -2.72 -7.10** -3.30
less than compact soc (2.47) (2.36) (2.27) (2.38) (2.28) (2.35) (2.27) (2.04) (2.88) (2.71)
Observations 91 93 91 94 96 90 93 22 74 96
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Settle non-settle Full
Notes. All models include a constant term, controls for latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country
pertains), and average societal complexity in a country. The geographical controls in column (2) are ruggedness, average temperature, average
precipitation, a dummy for landlocked countries, and share of the country area located within 100 km of the coast. The colonizer fixed effects in
column (5) are dummies for English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other European colonies. The model specifications in Panels A, B, and C
are identical except that political influence is proxied by wealth in panel A; proximity to the capital in panel B, and societal complexity in C.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 7. Robustness With Respect to Sample and Influential Observations
Dependent variable is mean polity2 1990-2010
Excl. Europe Excl. Excl. Excl. Excl.
and neo-Europe early decile late decile DFBETA Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Political influence proxied by economic activity
Indigenous democracy 4.44** 2.12 2.50* 2.32* 3.21**
(1.73) (1.52) (1.42) (1.23) (1.38)
Indigenous democracy 1.89*** 1.01* 1.09** 0.93** 1.07*
× light density (0.62) (0.60) (0.50) (0.39) (0.62)
Light density 0.31 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.49
(0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92 102 103 96 98
R-squared 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.53 0.46
Panel B Political influence proxied by proximity to the capital
Indigenous democracy within 4.89*** 4.29*** 4.09*** 3.61*** 5.34***
400 km. of capital (1.75) (1.30) (1.36) (1.30) (1.47)
Indigenous democracy outside -2.94 -2.79 -2.08 -2.73 -1.20
400 km. of capital (2.89) (2.44) (2.59) (2.92) (2.80)
Panel C Political influence proxied by societal complexity
Indigenous democracy with 4.77** 3.12* 3.63** 2.28 5.11***
complexity level >= 7 (2.12) (1.82) (1.67) (1.62) (1.79)
Indigenous democracy with -3.97 -4.49* -4.79* -2.90 -3.32
complexity level < 7 (2.46) (2.57) (2.58) (2.31) (2.57)
Notes. All models include a constant term. Baseline controls refers to controls for latitude, timing
(the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), and average
societal complexity in a country. The models in Panels B and C are identical to those in Panel A,
except that Panel B controls for country size (log). The model in column (5) excludes
the 194 societes for which the information in the Ethnographic Atlas refers to years before 1860.
Column (6) excludes the 54 societies with information from after year 1950.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
44
Table 8. Controlling for Alternative Drivers of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Political influence proxied by economic activity
Indigenous democracy 2.29* 2.94** 2.96** 2.35*
(1.36) (1.34) (1.48) (1.28)
Indigenous democracy x light density 1.15** 0.95* 1.17* 1.04**
(0.48) (0.50) (0.65) (0.49)
GDP per capita 0.96*
(0.56)
Protestant share 0.86
(4.50)
Muslim share -2.95
(2.23)
Ethnic fractionalization -1.33
(3.52)
Linguistic fractionalization 1.74
(3.30)
Religious fractionalization -0.84
(2.33)
Oil (1000 barrels) -0.73**
(0.30)
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.52
Panel B Political influence proxied by proximity to the capital
Indigenous democracy within 3.92*** 4.33*** 4.71*** 4.20***
400 km. of capital (1.44) (1.39) (1.46) (1.32)
Indigenous democracy outside -3.25 -1.37 -1.86 -2.68
400 km. of capital (2.22) (2.48) (2.72) (2.40)
Panel C Political influence proxied by societal complexity
Indigenous democracy in 3.35* 3.38* 3.80** 3.20*
compact or complex soc (1.71) (1.85) (1.87) (1.70)
Indigenous democracy in -3.46 -1.81 -3.23 -3.64
less than compact soc (2.38) (2.62) (3.13) (2.42)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101 102 99 102
Notes. All models include controls for latitude, timing (the average year to which
the ethnographic information in a country pertains and the average societal complexity
in a country. All models include a constant term (not reported). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics: Average Democracy across Continents
Notes. The figure shows mean polity2 across countries, split up into continents. Within each continent
the sample of countries is again split in two: Countries with below and above median level indigenous
democracy. The share of indigenous democratic societies is based on the variable ”succession of the local
headman” (described in the data section) and calculated across all 871 ethnographic societies in all the
blue bars, but only across the 251 ethnographic societies located within 400 km of the capital city in the
red bars. The number of countries behind the bars is as follows (<median,>median): World 53,53 in the
full sample (blue bars) and 51,35 in the influential sample (red bars); Africa 22,22 and 29,10; America
8,9 and 5,7; Asia and Oceania 18,17 and 16,11; Europe 4,6 and 2,6.
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Figure 2. Indigenous Democracy and Representative Government
Notes. The dots show the 871 ethnographic societies in our sample. The darker dots represent indigenous
democracy, where the local headman was selected by means of elections or communal consensus. Countries
are colored to represent contemporary democracy as measured by Polity IV. indigenous democracy, where
the local headman was selected by means of elections or communal consensus. Countries are colored to
represent contemporary democracy as measured by Polity IV.
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Figure 3: The Potential Influence of Unobserved Confounders
Notes. The figure shows the results of a generalized sensitivity analysis (Imbens 2003; Harada 2013).
The plusses represent the covariates that were included when we estimated the association between
indigenous democracy and contemporary democracy. These covariates are plotted according to their
partial association with the dependent variable (contemporary democracy) on the vertical axis and with
the regressor of interest (indigenous democracy) on the horizontal axis. The downwarding sloping curve
shows how much a covariate (observed or unobserved) should be correlated with both indigenous and
contemporary democracy in order to halve the observed association.
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